Malaysia has long been viewed as a model of a "moderate" Fostering this trend has been a combination of ideational shifts, generational change, and geopolitical transformation. Malaysia pro vides a valuable example of how redefinition of Islam and its relation ship with other political discourses (primarily democracy and ethni cism), the rise of younger leaders who came of age amid the Islamic resurgence, and attempts to position a Muslim-majority state strategi cally in a world focused intently on the purported dangers of Islam force religion to the forefront of political debates. This reconfiguration makes religion a primary-and perhaps the preeminent-line of cleav age dividing the Malaysian electorate. Rather than simply a Muslim/ non-Muslim dichotomy to parallel long-dominant racial divisions, this split also cuts across Malay Muslims and has made politics increas ingly contentious, volatile, and uncertain. The ultimate outcome could be a significant reorientation of Malaysia's trajectory of political devel opment.
By the late 1990s, the dominant perspective in Malaysian Islam appeared to be an inclusive, gradualist, and prodemocratic one. Islamic counterparts in a broad-based movement for social justice and political reform. Since then, however, the cooperation among these diverse partners has crumbled, and the attention of Muslim activists has been further diverted from general domestic political reforms to the U.S.-led war on terrorism and its implications for Malaysia. The gov erning Barisan Nasional coalition (BN, National Front) emerged still secure in its dominance, if "greener" (more Islamist) than before, hav ing weathered its most significant challenge since independence in 1957. The BN is headed by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), with Mahathir Mohamad (1981-October 2003) and then Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (November 2003-) as prime minister. UMNO is secular-nationalist, though with increasing attention to Islamization since the 1970s; it is the linchpin of BN, and the head of UMNO has always been head of government.
Why was Malaysia's moment of inclusionary and prodemocratic consensus disrupted? What accounts for the rise of ideological con tention, volatility, and uncertainty, especially since 1999? Why has incremental Islamization resulted not in stable accommodation among Islamists and secular political forces, but in the worsening of ideologi cal polarization and segmentation? This article will address these ques tions at three interrelated analytic levels. The next section below sug gests that gradual Islamization has made religious values the central issue of Malaysian politics, polarizing rather than unifying society. In Malaysia, Islamization opened the way to the fragmentation of politi cal society into three power blocs, as the debate over the role of reli gion inevitably had an impact upon the possibilities for democratiza tion and market-led modernization. Three core positions soon emerged, each with a powerful advocate. The next section then maps out these major ideological pos along two dimensions of attitudes, one regarding the establishme an Islamic state, the other regarding democratization. This mappi Malaysia's ideological terrain not only clarifies and fleshes out ological divergences noted in the first section but also shows how able the positions of the major political actors are on these k logical dimensions. Competition has forced the two political most dominant today, UMNO and PAS, into ambiguous-if no nally contradictory-political platforms. Each has constantly to ju new ideas and strategies to counter criticisms and to find a b between frequently incompatible demands for Islamization and ratization coming from different societal sectors. This increasing dent ideological inconsistency has imbued Malaysian party p with a high degree of uncertainty and volatility: even if UM tinues to dominate, the content of its party platform may chang nificantly over time.
UMNO insists that Malaysia has already met the requireme an Islamic state as well as can be expected in a postcolonial, m gious context, implying that there is no need for further Islamiz and, by extension, for voters to support PAS. PAS, in contrast, c full implementation of sharia law in order to differentiate itself fr "secular" UMNO in electoral competition. At the same time, promises to disavow discrimination on the basis of race, language even religion with the goal of bringing reform-minded, secular o In a secular state, concepts like citizenship, nationality and sover eignty ... are framed within a secular framework where one's iden tity is based on the status of the subject as a private individual rather than the member of a faith community. Conversely, membership to a religious state entails a transition to a new ideational framework . . . where those who belong to religion X will be the "natural citizens" of that state and others not In such a religious state, the status and identity of those who do not belong to the dominant faith community will always be hanging in the balance."
To sum up, especially in PAS's poorly specified conception of an Islamic state, the rights and status of non-Muslims (and of women of all religions) remain unresolved at best and dubious at worst.
Islam and Democracy
Islamization has also forced a rethinking of the relationship between Islam and democracy and the role of Islamic values in the building of modern political institutions. Like the concept of citizenship and national identity, questions of democracy and keadilan (justice) have been amenable to diverse and even contradictory understandings. One group of liberal political activists trying to establish a genuinely secu lar state has strenuously tried to reinterpret or recreate Islam as an essentially democratic discourse in order to harness it for political lib eralization. Among them is scholar-activist Chandra Muzaffar, who ardently argues that universal values like freedom, justice, and equality are all integral parts of the teachings of classical Islamic philosophy and embedded in the Quran and sharia law. According to him, it has been repressive political elites in Muslim societies as well as intolerant new Islamic movements that have impeded the development of civil society based on this generally prodemocratic Islamic value system.12
In Malaysia, these obstacles have impeded the progress of "civil To arrest the apparent drift toward extremism, Mahathir announced plans for establishing a compulsory "national service program" for all eighteen-year-old male citizens. Although it is a costly and controversial initiative, as one UMNO official explained, "It's the best way to force the races to mix [with one another], . . . And it's a good way to shape young minds."25 The government has also pursued various modifica tions to the national education system, with the aim both of undercutting private religious schools that Mahathir said were "brainwashing" stu dents to oppose the government and of fostering greater ethnic integra tion. With these changes, private Islamic education would come directly under state regulation. Under the pretext of ensuring "quality education"
for all students, the government has temporarily stopped funding private Islamic schools and is making plans to absorb the approximately 126,000 students enrolled at private Islamic schools into "secular" pub lic schools, where any Islamic education can be closely monitored.26 Moreover, to redress ethnic separatism, non-Malays would be encour aged or forced to enroll at national schools, too, rather than attend pri vate schools. Making national schools more palatable especially for eth nic Chinese students would be a shift to a greater emphasis on English-medium rather than Malay-medium education. Even so, such a change in education policy was controversial given the political capital invested over the years in the maintenance of vernacular education.27
That the regime pursued these initiatives in spite of their high costs vividly showed its determination to control the flow of ideas and dis courses related to Islam.
Foreign Policy
Another dimension along which Islamization has had and will likely continue to have a polarizing effect is Malaysia's relationship with "the most purposeful expression of an Islamization process that UMNO had ever made."46 The government also introduced Islamic reforms in the financial sector, establishing Islamic insurance schemes and usury free banking; strengthened Islamic education policies; stressed the observance of Islamic rituals in official government settings; sponsored centers for research and teaching on Islam; and enhanced Islam-related programming in the state-controlled media. However, as part of its perennial task of balancing and moderation, the government also stressed multiethnic power-sharing and muhibbah (cultural and reli gious tolerance and accommodation), even as language and education policies increasingly emphasized the preeminent place of Malays in state, society, and national culture.47 UMNO in a sense has been trying to prove to the general public that it is more "Islamic" than what its opponents make it out to be. The ruling political party's embracing Islamic values was less by choice than the byproduct of electoral competition. The primary challenge to its political hegemony being an Islamist one, UMNO finds itself forced to take on a more Islamic timbre to defend its constituency. Because of the reactive or defensive nature of its Islamization strategy, UMNO has taken on PAS in struggling for the "hearts and minds" of the Malay electorate less by contesting the rightness of Islamic governance in multireligious Malaysia than by excoriating PAS's particular "brand" of Islam as inferior or insisting that the party can be trusted to uphold Islamic precepts and institutions at least as well as PAS. As part of this strategy, Mahathir's UMNO lavished money on mosques, the Interna tional Islamic University, state-run dakwah organizations, and the like.
More recently (described below), to negate the raison d'etre of PAS and its electoral platform, Mahathir declared Malaysia to be already an Islamic state in spirit as well as in reality. Also, in the face of Septem ber 11 and the subsequent war on terror, he increased his efforts to proj ect Malaysia as a benignly moderate (i.e., not conducive to terrorism) Islamic state at home and abroad.
Though PAS deemed these institutional and ideological efforts at Islamization too moderate, they appear quite radical from a secular per spective. Farish Noor argues that "it was the UMNO-led government's Islamisation policy which began in the 1980s that really helped to nor malize political religion in everyday life, marginalizing whatever hopes The dualistic self-identity of UMNO as a devout but pragmatic political party has put it in a complex place in international relations. In contrast to this comparatively radical approach, a more moder ate discourse stressing the prodemocratic predilections of Islamic gov ernance and the possibility of cooperation between Islamic and secular parties has also taken root in Malaysia. This discourse highlights uni versal values like judicial independence, economic redistribution, and human rights and sees them as compatible with not only secular philosophies but also religious texts, including the Quran. This These two trends, one more radical and the other moderate, are not wholly incompatible. Most important, "true" Islamic governance is defined by many advocates as precluding racial discrimination: indi viduals may occupy different statuses in the polity based on religion, but not based on race or ethnicity. In its party constitution, PAS prom ises to act fairly toward all Malaysians and to promote interracial har mony, and the party has disavowed discrimination on the basis of race, language, nation, and even (somewhat problematically) religion from the outset. PAS officials have pledged regularly (if somewhat inconsis tently) at least since the mid-1980s to abolish Malay special rights and bumiputera privileges if the party comes to power and have accepted the possibility of even a non-Malay prime minister, though they are less prepared to accept one who is not Muslim.71 A multiracial perspective is broadly acceptable to both moderates and radicals in the party. More over, the Reformasi movement's emphasis on "justice" could capture more theocratically as well as secularly inclined Islamists. The core of that movement had less to do with the regime's secular nature per se than with issues of socioeconomic justice, judicial integrity, and accountable governance, all of which were said to be mandated by Islam and upheld more consistently by PAS than by UMNO. This mes sage was not so far removed from PAS's stance in the mid-1950s, when Burhanuddin al-Helmy proposed that "the forces of nationalism, the forces of Islamism and the forces of socialism . . . are not separable from one another but are in fact related to one another."72 Thus, although PAS had been drifting toward a more doctrinal approach through the 1980s and 1990s, this more pragmatic, bridge-building position reversed that trend. Doing so allowed the party to woo other wise hesitant urban and secular-minded voters to PAS, Malay-domi nated Keadilan, and the opposition more broadly in the late 1990s.
PAS Since the opposition against Mahathir's Malay-centric regime is partly based on an Islamist platform, the spiraling Islamization of dis course and policies is probably inevitable. Such an outcome represents continuity far more than any cataclysmic realignment. Anthropologist Judith Nagata's caveat from the mid-1980s remains germane: "The cur rent resurgence of dakwah among certain elements of the Malay-Mus lim population must be placed in the context of the lengthy historical sequence from which the present ethnic and political situation has evolved." She explains that the dakwah movement is not a "mere fash Despite sometimes hyperbolic media accounts and dire warnings, continuing uncertainty in electoral politics and party affairs is not likely to bring any dramatic institutional changes. Malaysia's constitutional character will continue to limit the pace and magnitude of Islamization.
Other checks aside, it is unlikely that PAS will ever get strong enough Finally, now more than perhaps ever before, the international dimension is particularly salient to an understanding of Malaysian domestic politics. The U.S.-led aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the omnipresent Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has radicalized some Muslims in Malaysia, encouraging PAS to take a particularly aggressive stance against the United States and in favor of Muslim unity. Meanwhile, in cracking down on purported Islamic militancy while also asserting the viability of a more moderate course, Mahathir was able not only to weaken PAS by asserting the dangers of radical Islam (i.e., PAS) but also to position Malaysia propitiously in the inter national order. The combination of Mahathir's agile management of the country's national image and foreign policy in a time of global crisis and PAS's seeming radicalization goes far to ensure the continuity of BN hegemony, especially if Mahathir's successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, can ply the same course. Even so, beneath the broad gloss of continuity will be continued shifts and countershifts as factions and parties jostle for position. More broadly, the interplay of changes in ideas, demographics, and geopolitics ensures that Islam will remain a core aspect of how Malaysians think of the nation and of how policy making and political contests take shape for the foreseeable future.
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